



WWW.IPPR.ORG

Britain's Immigrants

An economic profile

A report for Class Films and Channel 4 Dispatches

September 2007

© ippr 2007

Institute for Public Policy Research

Challenging ideas – Changing policy

Contents

About ippr	2
About this report	2
Note on the data	2
Acronyms and glossary	3
1. Introduction	4
2. Data sources and methodology	6
3. Recent trends in migration to the UK	8
4. Selecting immigrant groups	11
5. Socio-economic profile	17
6. Trends over time	32
7. Conclusions	43
References	46

About ippr

The Institute for Public Policy Research is the UK's leading progressive think tank, producing cutting-edge research and innovative policy ideas for a just, democratic and sustainable world.

Since 1988, we have been at the forefront of progressive debate and policymaking in the UK. Through our independent research and analysis we define new agendas for change and provide practical solutions to challenges across the full range of public policy issues.

With offices in both London and Newcastle, we ensure our outlook is as broad-based as possible, while our international and migration teams and climate change programme extend our partnerships and influence beyond the UK, giving us a truly world-class reputation for high quality research.

About this report

This report has been prepared for Class Films and Channel 4 *Dispatches* by Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, Laurence Cooley and Tracy Kornblatt.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of ippr, Class Films or Channel 4.

Note on the data

Material from the Labour Force Survey is Crown Copyright, has been made available by National Statistics through the UK Data Archive and has been used by permission. Neither National Statistics nor the Data Archive bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here.

Acronyms and glossary

A8	The eight Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in May 2004 (Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia)
BME	Black and minority ethnic
CPI	Consumer Prices Index
DfES	Department for Education and Skills
EEA	European Economic Area, a free trade area made up of the 27 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
EU	European Union
G8	Group of Eight, an international forum for the governments of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US
IPS	International Passenger Survey
LFS	Labour Force Survey
LLTI	Limiting long-term illness
New Commonwealth	The members of the Commonwealth that joined following decolonisation, located mainly in the developing world
NI	National Insurance
NVQ	National Vocational Qualification
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, an association of 30 countries with developed market economies
Old Commonwealth	The former settler countries of the Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada)
ONS	Office for National Statistics
SAR	Special administrative region of China

1. Introduction

This report has been produced to form the empirical basis of an episode of Channel 4's *Dispatches* series on the economic characteristics of Britain's immigrant communities and the contributions they make to the country.

The economic impact of immigration to the UK is a controversial issue. The contribution that immigrants make to the UK economy has been one of the most contested areas within research, policymaking and in the media. Researchers produce often contradictory evidence on the impacts of immigration, political parties argue about how best to manage migration and its impacts, and the media is full of stories about various aspects of immigration.

However, despite this attention, there is very little information on the economic characteristics and contribution of Britain's immigrants. This is unfortunate because it means that policymakers do not have the evidence base they need on which to base good policies, and because it leads to claims being made about immigrants and immigration that are based on intuition and assumption rather than hard data.

This report attempts to contribute fresh information about the characteristics and contribution of some of the UK's largest immigrant communities. It presents data on a range of indicators of the socio-economic characteristics of 25 groups of people defined by their country of birth (which we refer to as 'country-of-birth groups') living in the UK, plus those of the UK-born as a comparator. The report also explores and outlines some of the factors that shape these socio-economic outcomes and highlights trends over time. While a complete picture cannot be drawn because of the lack of comprehensive data, we believe this report uses the best available evidence from the best available sources to present a picture of how Britain's immigrant communities compare with each other and compare with the UK-born population across several key economic criteria.

It is important to note at the outset what this report *does* and *does not* do. The main section of the report looks solely at immigrants defined as people living in the UK who were born outside the UK. It is important to note that this analysis therefore only looks at immigrants themselves (that is people who moved to the UK). Second, third and subsequent generations (that is, people of immigrant descent who were born in the UK) are not considered. This is important for a number of reasons:

- Some people might find it inappropriate or offensive to talk about people born in the UK (especially where they are third- or fourth-generation British born) as immigrants. Some of this group may belong to ethnic minorities but they are not immigrants in the true sense of the word.
- Even if we did want to look at descendents of immigrants (and were able to arrive at a suitable definition of when someone stops being considered an 'immigrant'), it would be difficult to do so because almost nobody collects data on these groups. There is of course lots of evidence on ethnic groups but these are very broad and fail to capture the differences and nuances between immigrant communities (see ippr's *Beyond Black and White* report (Kyambi 2005)).
- When trying to work out how much new immigration the UK should have, it is best to look at what impacts recent immigrants are having.

That said, it is clear that in order to assess the impacts of immigration, it is necessary to understand the socio-economic characteristics of not only immigrants themselves, but also their descendents, particularly since there can be significant differences between the economic profile of immigrants and of their children. We therefore briefly consider, in Section 6, some data on the socio-economic characteristics of Britain's various ethnic groups, alongside data comparing the economic profile of groups born abroad ('foreign-born') over time, in order to gain some understanding of the dynamic and changing nature of populations.

This report looks at the **economic** characteristics and contributions of immigrants. It is an attempt to piece together some of the dimensions that we consider to be good reflectors of

socio-economic profile. **It should not be seen as *the definitive picture of all the economic characteristics of immigrant communities***. It draws on one set of indicators to act as proxies for measuring these dimensions. As such, while we are confident that the data presented in this report is as good as we can get, it should be treated as merely *indicative* of what is going on rather than definitive and final. There are, of course, many other, non-economic ways in which immigration may affect the UK but these are not considered by this project.

It is also vital that the evidence on average **outcomes within communities is not confused with individual characteristics**. Just because a particular community has certain average features does not mean that all members of that community share those features. There will be some members of each community who are substantially different from the average. In other words, while this report focuses on differences between groups, in some instances the differences within groups may be more significant and therefore more important.

Finally, we hope this report will help readers to understand some of the real opportunities and challenges that immigration presents. It is an attempt to present some of the diversity in socio-economic outcomes among immigrant communities and help policymakers and others understand where there is real need for better interventions; **it is not an attempt to cast immigrant communities in a bad or good light**.

Structure of the report

Section 2 introduces the methodology employed in the report and the main data source used, the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Section 3 then outlines some of the key trends in recent migration to the UK. This is followed by an outline in Section 4 of how we have selected the 25 country-of-birth groups that are featured in our analysis. Section 5 contains the main analysis of the report, followed by an examination of trends over time in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the report by outlining and seeking to explain some of the key trends that appear from our research findings.

2. Data sources and methodology

The most comprehensive data sources that are available on the socio-economic characteristics of groups born overseas and living in the UK (our 'country-of-birth' groups) are the Census and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Whereas the Census is only carried out once a decade and was last conducted in 2001, the LFS is a quarterly survey and is thus much more up-to-date. We therefore use the LFS as the source for the majority of our analysis.

The LFS is a comprehensive survey of households conducted to collect information on the labour market. While it does not collect data on immigration status, it does include questions on country of birth and nationality. The LFS provides data on a consistent set of variables over long time frames and is highly regarded because it uses internationally agreed concepts and definitions. Until recently, not much analysis had been conducted making use of the country-of-birth data available in the LFS. However, several recent reports have highlighted the value of the survey as a source of data on immigrant communities (see, for example, Haque 2002, Kyambi 2005, Spence 2005).

We need to bear in mind, though, that whereas the Census is a count of the total population, the LFS is based on population samples, and is therefore prone to sampling error. The standard error for an estimate of 500,000 people, for instance, is 13,800 and the 95 per cent confidence interval is +/-27,100 (see Office for National Statistics 2003), meaning that we can be 95 per cent sure that the actual figure is within 27,100 of 500,000. These errors become proportionally larger, the smaller the estimate. Furthermore, there are also likely to be non-sampling errors, caused by factors such as potential respondents' unwillingness to take part in the survey or respondents answering questions inaccurately. Response rates tend to be lower for minority groups and in the case of migrant workers there can be under-reporting because non-private communal accommodation is not covered by the survey (Office for National Statistics 2003).

In order to analyse the characteristics of immigrant groups, we have appended eight quarters of LFS data together. This increases the total sample size and therefore allows for more detailed analysis of socio-economic characteristics than is possible using a single quarter of data, and ensures that the results are representative. The LFS-based socio-economic data in this report is therefore for the period 2005, quarter one (Q1) to 2006, quarter four (Q4). The data for these eight quarters is the latest available from the UK Data Archive. Data for each of these quarters is available in the new calendar format, to which the LFS recently switched, in line with EU regulations.

Because each household in the LFS is surveyed in five successive quarters, we have used the *thiswv* variable to ensure that each household is only included once in the appended dataset. When selecting waves, there should be a preference for waves 1 and 5, since these are the waves that data on income is collected. The selection process we have used is represented in Figure 2.1. Representations of individual respondents are colour-coded in the diagram. For example, a respondent in wave 1 in 2005 Q1 is shaded grey. Their progress through the survey waves can be traced by following the grey shading diagonally through to wave 5 in 2006 Q1, when their participation comes to an end. Similarly, new wave 1 respondents in 2005 Q2 are shaded black and participate in the survey until 2006 Q2. The observations used in the analysis are asterisked, and represent the maximum number of waves that can be included without any one respondent being represented more than once in the sample.

Figure 2.1. Labour Force Survey wave selection

	2005				2006			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Survey wave	1	1	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	5*	5*	5*	5*	5*	5*	5	5

* Included in sample

In order to define groups by people's country of birth, we have used the LFS variable *cryox*. Background data on the groups has been generated using the variables *sex*, *age*, *totnum*, *totfu* and *cameyr*. All data is weighted using either *pwt03* or *piwt03*.


In Section 6, which deals with 1995/96 data, we have manually constructed our own country-of-birth variable based on *cry* and *cryo* because the *croyx* variable does not exist in the Stata LFS datasets from 1995 and 1996. The ethnicity data presented in Section 6 has been generated using the same variables used in the country-of-birth analysis, but with the variable *ethcen15* in place of *cryox*.

Data on employment status and self-employment has been generated using the *ilodefr* and *statr* variables; education data using *edage*; gross hourly pay using *hourpay*; hours worked using *tothrs*; and house ownership using *ten96* and *ten1*. Tax and National Insurance contributions have been calculated from individual income data generated using the *grsswk* variable, and state benefit usage has been generated using *tpben3(1-8)*. Social housing usage has been calculated using *land96* and *llord*. Public service employment has been calculated from the *inds92m* variable. Where necessary, we have used the *age* and *cured* variables to exclude non-working-age people and students in full-time education from the labour market analysis, and *cameyr* to restrict analysis to settled immigrants. In this report we use the standard definition of working age: 16–64 for males and 16–59 for females.

Because the LFS is a sample-based survey rather than a population census, data from it should be treated as estimates subject to the errors outlined above. We have rounded the data in the LFS-based tables in this report, usually to the nearest one per cent, but the figures remain estimates rather than definitive. If it were possible to collect actual data on the entire population, rather than via a sample, the rankings in some of the tables, particularly those where several groups have very close values, may differ somewhat from those presented here.


3. Recent trends in migration to the UK

While the UK has a long history of both immigration and emigration (see Winder 2004, Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006), it is only recently that the UK has become a net recipient of migrants. According to International Passenger Survey (IPS) data collected from people moving through UK ports and airports, the net flow of migrants (defined as people moving into or out of the UK for 12 months or more) became positive during the mid 1980s. Prior to this, outflows of British nationals to countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, but also increasingly to European destinations such as France and Spain, outpaced the flow of immigrants to the UK, as shown in Figure 3.1.



While the UK started to become a country of net immigration in the 1980s, the rate of immigration started to rise markedly in the mid-1990s. Net immigration reached a peak of 222,600 people in 2004, before falling back to 185,000 in 2005, when the UK gained an estimated 292,000 foreign nationals and lost 107,000 British nationals in net terms.

Figure 3.2 shows the gross inflow of migrants to the UK since 1995 by region of origin, based on country-of-birth data from the IPS. Note that the countries that joined the EU in May 2004 are classified under 'other' until 2004, when they move to the EU category. Malta and Cyprus also move to the EU category, from the 'New Commonwealth' grouping. Note that a significant proportion of the inflow in each year is composed of UK-born people, representing the return migration of people who had previously emigrated.



The increase in foreign immigration since the mid 1990s is the result of a number of factors. Firstly, against the backdrop of 'the emergence of a global migration market, mainly for the highly skilled' (Dobson *et al* 2001: 3), the number of work permits issued rose steeply in the late 1990s (see Cooley *et al* 2005). There was also a rise in the number of asylum applications to a peak of 84,130 principal applicants in 2002 (Home Office 2006). The number of asylum applications has since fallen back to levels on a par with the early 1990s, with 23,520 applications received in 2006 (Home Office 2007). There have also been significant inflows of foreign students coming to study at British universities, and of migrants moving to join their families in the UK.

With the enlargement of the EU in May 2004, citizens of the new member states gained the right to work in the UK, just as UK citizens are able to work elsewhere in the Union. The UK, along with Ireland and Sweden, decided not to place any restrictions on the number of people who could migrate from the new member states.¹ In the period from May 2004 to March 2007, 605,375 people from the eight new Central and Eastern European member states (known as the 'A8') successfully registered to work in the UK (Home Office *et al* 2007). Poles made up the largest single nationality of migrants to the UK in 2005, the latest year for which data is available (Office for National Statistics 2006).

At this stage it is unknown what proportion of A8 migrants remain in the UK at any one time, particularly since many of these migrants come to the UK to undertake temporary jobs in sectors such as agriculture and food processing. A recent report found that just under one quarter of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe planned on settling permanently in the UK (Spencer *et al* 2007), a much lower proportion than is the case with previous groups of immigrants. Citizens of Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the EU on 1 January 2007, do not enjoy free access to the UK labour market at present, although the Government has agreed to regularly review this situation.

A further category that needs to be considered, but which is harder to quantify, is irregular migrants. A study conducted for the Home Office estimates that there were around 430,000 unauthorised migrants in the UK at the time of the 2001 census (Pinkerton *et al* 2004, Woodbridge 2005). The methodology of that study has been questioned though, with Dorling (2007a) stating that it may have resulted in US military personnel, for example, being counted as unauthorised migrants.

Widespread public concerns about people entering the UK illegally through the Channel Tunnel in the early 2000s led to the closure of the Red Cross camp at Sangatte in France in late 2002, increased security at Eurotunnel's freight yards and improved immigration controls run by the Home Office in Calais, all of which curtailed the flow of people entering the UK illegally. It is likely that people overstaying their visas account for a larger share of irregular migrants than do clandestine entrants (Farrant *et al* 2006).

The impact of rising immigration has been to increase the proportion of the population born overseas. The Census data presented in Table 3.1 shows that the population born abroad ('foreign-born') has steadily risen from 2.1 million (4.2 per cent of the population) in 1951 to 4.9 million (8.3 per cent) in 2001.

¹ Some other member states that did not open their labour markets in 2004, such as Italy and Spain, have since dropped all restrictions on migration from the new Central and Eastern European members (see BBC News 2007).

Table 3.1. The foreign-born population of the UK, 1951-2001

	Total foreign-born	Percentage increase over previous decade	Percentage of total population
1951	2,118,600	-	4.2
1961	2,573,500	21.5	4.9
1971	3,190,300	24.0	5.8
1981	3,429,100	7.5	6.2
1991	3,835,400	11.8	6.7
2001	4,896,600	27.7	8.3

Source: Rendall and Salt 2005

According to OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) data for 2005, 9.7 per cent of the UK population is foreign-born. This is slightly higher than the OECD average, but is considerably lower than that of countries such as the US, Canada or Australia, where 12.9, 19.1 and 23.8 per cent of the populations are foreign-born respectively (OECD 2007a). The OECD average was 11.2 per cent foreign-born in 2004, the latest year for which data is available (OECD 2007b).

Despite recent high levels of immigration, the proportion of the UK population born overseas also remains lower than in many other European countries. For example, in 2005, 23.8 per cent of the Swiss population, 13.5 per cent of the Austrian population, 12.4 per cent of the Swedish population, and 11 per cent of the Irish population were foreign-born (OECD 2007a).

The most up-to-date figure for the size of the UK's foreign-born population can be estimated using the LFS, subject to the qualifications outlined in Section 2 of this report. The LFS reports that 10.1 per cent of the total population in 2006 Q4 was foreign-born.

4. Selecting immigrant groups

Selection of country-of-birth groups

In order to explore the diversity of socio-economic outcomes of immigrants in the UK, we have selected 25 country-of-birth groups for further investigation. We go on to perform analysis on the UK-born population to provide a means of comparison between the immigrant and non-immigrant population. It is important to note that the LFS data presented in this section represents immigrants defined as those people living in the UK who were born abroad. The UK-born group therefore includes all second, third and subsequent-generation immigrants. It is particularly important to appreciate this given the tendency of public discourse to confuse immigrants with settled black and minority ethnic (BME) communities.

While there may be smaller groups that are of interest, in order to achieve sufficient sample sizes to carry out statistically robust analysis, the 25 country-of-birth groups have been drawn from those reported by the LFS as constituting more than 60,000 people, which are shown in Table 4.1. Any such cut-off is essentially an arbitrary one, but we have chosen the number 60,000 because with groups smaller than this, cell sizes frequently become too small when country of birth is cross-tabulated with other variables.

Table 4.1. Country-of-birth groups in the UK with more than 60,000 members, 2006 Q4

Rank	Country of birth	Estimated group size	Percentage of total population
1	UK	52,980,100	89.93
2	India	578,600	0.98
3	Republic of Ireland	425,300	0.72
4	Poland	318,600	0.54
5	Pakistan	306,400	0.52
6	Germany	269,350	0.46
7	Bangladesh	208,900	0.35
8	South Africa	189,900	0.32
9	USA	183,700	0.31
10	Jamaica	162,650	0.28
11	Former USSR	151,900	0.26
12	Nigeria	146,300	0.25
13	Kenya	123,600	0.21
14	Australia	120,250	0.20
15	France	117,300	0.20
16	Zimbabwe	103,650	0.18
17	Sri Lanka	102,950	0.17
18	Philippines	99,650	0.17
19	Italy	98,950	0.17
20	Ghana	96,650	0.16
21	Other Africa	95,000	0.16
22	Somalia	82,300	0.14
23	Other Asia	81,650	0.14
24	China	77,800	0.13
25	Canada	75,000	0.13
26	Former Czechoslovakia	74,500	0.13
27	Turkey	69,400	0.12
28	Hong Kong	65,800	0.11
29	Other Middle East	65,150	0.11
30	Cyprus	64,300	0.11
31	Portugal	62,200	0.11
32	Iran	60,900	0.10
33	Uganda	60,350	0.10

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Note that there is considerable variation in estimates of country-of-birth group sizes between LFS quarters, for the reasons outlined in Section 2 above, and these results should therefore be viewed as less accurate than those given in the Census. The figures in Table 4.1 should therefore be seen as a guide for use in the country-of-birth selection process rather than as a definitive picture of precise country-of-birth group sizes.

From this initial list, we then dropped regional groupings ('other Africa', 'other Asia' and 'other Middle East') and former countries that are now split into several independent states (former USSR and former Czechoslovakia). People born in Germany also present a problem since a large portion of this group are likely to be the children of British military personnel based in Germany (Kyambi 2005, Dorling 2007b). Indeed, 68.8 per cent of German-born people in the latest LFS quarter are reported to be British nationals.² For this reason, we have dropped Germany from the list of potential country-of-birth groups. This is not to suggest that this group of German-born British children is not an interesting one: returning military personnel and their foreign-born children appear to move to areas where 'almost no other group now wishes to migrate' (Dorling 2007b: 25) and often suffer quite poor socio-economic outcomes. Nonetheless, not being able to separate out German-born Germans and German-born Britons is a key problem, and we have therefore excluded the German-born from our analysis.

We have also merged China, Hong Kong and Macau into one Chinese-born category since Hong Kong and Macau are now special administrative regions (SARs) of China. This yields a total Chinese-born group of 144,050, according to the 2006 Q4 LFS.

This leaves us with 25 country-of-birth groups (India, Republic of Ireland, Poland, Pakistan, Bangladesh, South Africa, USA, Jamaica, Nigeria, China including Hong Kong and Macau, Kenya, Australia, France, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Italy, Ghana, Somalia, Canada, Turkey, Cyprus, Portugal, Iran and Uganda), plus the UK-born for comparison. The estimated size of these country-of-birth groups is shown in Table 4.2.

² Since, as EU citizens, Germans in the UK enjoy many of the same rights as British nationals, they are unlikely to take up British citizenship. Furthermore, immigrants from high-income countries are less likely to take up British citizenship than those from lower-income countries (Rendall and Salt 2005). We therefore consider the majority of German-born British nationals to be the German-born children of British parents, rather than naturalised citizens, although there will clearly be some of the latter represented in the data, including refugees who came to Britain during the Second World War.

Table 4.2. Selected country-of-birth group sizes, 2006 Q4

Rank	Country of birth	Estimated group size	Percentage of total population
1	UK	52,980,100	89.93
2	India	578,600	0.98
3	Republic of Ireland	425,300	0.72
4	Poland	318,600	0.54
5	Pakistan	306,400	0.52
6	Bangladesh	208,900	0.35
7	South Africa	189,900	0.32
8	USA	183,700	0.31
9	Jamaica	162,650	0.28
10	Nigeria	146,300	0.25
11	China	144,050	0.24
12	Kenya	123,600	0.21
13	Australia	120,250	0.20
14	France	117,300	0.20
15	Zimbabwe	103,650	0.18
16	Sri Lanka	102,950	0.17
17	Philippines	99,650	0.17
18	Italy	98,950	0.17
19	Ghana	96,650	0.16
20	Somalia	82,300	0.14
21	Canada	75,000	0.13
22	Turkey	69,400	0.12
23	Cyprus	64,300	0.11
24	Portugal	62,200	0.11
25	Iran	60,900	0.10
26	Uganda	60,350	0.10

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Basic characteristics of selected communities

Table 4.3 presents some summary background data on the groups selected above. It includes data on gender and age distribution, average age, the proportion of each group that has arrived in the UK since 1996, average household size and the average number of family units living in one household. It should be noted that there is an inherent tendency for there to be more recent arrivals than settled migrants, even assuming no increase in immigration, because the chances of re-emigration increase with time spent in the UK. The two columns on the right-hand side of the table show average household size and the average number of people living in each household, by the country of birth of the occupiers. Average household size is not necessarily equal to average family size, since there may be more than one family unit living in a household.

Table 4.3. Background information on country-of-birth groups, 2005/06

Country of birth	Gender		Age distribution					Average age	Percentage arrived since 1996	Average household size	Average no. families in household
	Male	Female	0-15	16-24	25-44	45-64	65+				
UK	49%	51%	21%	11%	26%	25%	16%	39	N/A	3.0	1.1
India	49%	51%	4%	5%	39%	35%	17%	46	33%	3.3	1.1
Republic of Ireland	44%	56%	3%	4%	20%	36%	38%	56	11%	2.4	1.1
Poland	53%	47%	8%	22%	49%	9%	11%	34	80%	2.8	1.2
Pakistan	51%	49%	6%	10%	48%	28%	9%	40	34%	5.1	1.6
Bangladesh	52%	48%	4%	12%	52%	23%	9%	39	25%	4.8	1.5
South Africa	48%	52%	11%	20%	46%	17%	6%	34	64%	3.3	1.2
USA	47%	53%	19%	11%	40%	22%	7%	35	53%	3.2	1.3
Jamaica	43%	57%	3%	5%	21%	38%	33%	53	17%	2.6	1.2
Nigeria	52%	48%	8%	12%	53%	23%	4%	37	48%	4.0	1.5
China	48%	52%	7%	25%	37%	23%	8%	36	49%	3.3	2.0
Kenya	49%	51%	3%	5%	37%	49%	6%	45	11%	3.4	1.4
Australia	46%	54%	8%	10%	58%	17%	7%	35	52%	2.7	1.1
France	44%	56%	15%	13%	51%	14%	7%	34	56%	3.6	1.0
Zimbabwe	47%	53%	14%	12%	53%	18%	2%	32	75%	2.5	1.1
Sri Lanka	55%	45%	6%	8%	50%	28%	7%	40	47%	3.9	1.7
Philippines	36%	64%	19%	2%	54%	22%	2%	34	74%	4.3	1.3
Italy	49%	51%	5%	4%	33%	25%	33%	51	28%	2.3	1.1
Ghana	49%	51%	5%	11%	52%	28%	4%	38	40%	2.7	1.6
Somalia	38%	62%	20%	19%	45%	10%	6%	31	72%	3.8	1.2
Canada	45%	55%	9%	7%	41%	30%	13%	42	34%	2.5	1.4
Turkey	51%	49%	9%	19%	52%	16%	3%	33	45%	2.3	1.1
Cyprus	49%	51%	5%	5%	30%	41%	18%	48	8%	2.9	1.0
Portugal	44%	56%	13%	14%	54%	16%	3%	33	56%	4.0	1.6
Iran	60%	40%	7%	17%	38%	33%	5%	38	36%	3.8	1.0
Uganda	49%	51%	2%	11%	36%	42%	9%	44	22%	2.6	1.4

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Immigration status

Before analysing the characteristics and profile of our country-of-birth groups, it is perhaps useful to gain an understanding of the immigration routes that are most relevant to each of the groups. **Table 4.4 is intended to be an indicative guide to the likely immigration status of members of each of our 25 country-of-birth groups**, but we do not claim that it is in any way comprehensive.

Migration is a varied experience and immigrant groups themselves are incredibly heterogeneous, which means that many of the assumptions commonly made about certain communities are generalisations not necessarily borne out in reality. For example, while the public impression of the Indian community may be that it is largely composed of Commonwealth immigrants who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s, the community in fact includes large numbers of recently-arrived work permit holders working in sectors such as IT. Likewise, while the Somali community is largely composed of refugees and asylum seekers who have come to the UK as a result of the violence that has been rife in Somalia since the early 1990s, Somalis have been arriving in the UK since the mid-nineteenth century, at that time to work on ships and in the docks (Harris 2004) and there are also small numbers of Somalis who have come to the UK as work permit holders in recent years.

While certain immigration channels are likely to be used by many of our nationalities (such as the working holidaymaker scheme, which is available to all Commonwealth citizens) and there are also likely to be students from all of our country-of-birth groups, Table 4.4 only notes these categories where there are relatively large numbers of working holidaymakers or students from these countries.

Where reference is made to 'Commonwealth immigrants' in the table, this indicates that a large proportion of immigrants arrived in the UK from Commonwealth countries exercising their migration and settlement rights. While many of these rights were restricted by the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, there continued to be a steady flow of people from Commonwealth countries who came to join family here or with an offer of employment.

Table 4.4. Guide to the likely immigration status of members of our selected country-of-birth groups (cont. next page)

Country of birth	Immigration status of community
India	Commonwealth immigrants, recent work permit holders and some asylum seekers and refugees, working holidaymakers plus a large number of students
Republic of Ireland	Have never been subject to UK immigration controls so free to live and work in the UK. Now enjoy EU national rights in the UK.
Poland	New EU nationals, free to come to the UK if they register on the Worker Registration Scheme, or are self-employed, or can prove they can support themselves without recourse to state benefits; settled community of Second World War refugees and European Volunteer Workers
Pakistan	Commonwealth immigrants, recent work permit holders and some asylum seekers and refugees, plus students
Bangladesh	Commonwealth immigrants, recent work permit holders and some asylum seekers and refugees
South Africa	Work permit holders, people with rights to settle in the UK on the basis of ancestry, and working holidaymakers
USA	Work permit holders, people with rights to settle in the UK on the basis of ancestry, and students
Jamaica	Commonwealth immigrants, recent work permit holders and a small number of asylum seekers and refugees
Nigeria	Work permit holders, students, refugees and asylum seekers,
China (including SARs)	Former Hong Kong residents, work permit holders, students, refugees and asylum seekers

Kenya	Older flows of settled migrants (including white Britons and Asians born in Kenya), recent work permit flows and a small number of asylum seekers
Australia	Work permit holders, people with rights to settle in the UK on the basis of ancestry, students and working holidaymakers
France	EU nationals free to live and work in the UK
Zimbabwe	Work permit holders, people with rights to settle in the UK on the basis of ancestry, refugees and asylum seekers
Sri Lanka	Commonwealth immigrants, students, refugees and asylum seekers
Philippines	Largely composed of work permit holders
Italy	EU nationals free to live and work in the UK
Ghana	Largely composed of work permit holders
Somalia	Largely refugees and asylum seekers, with a small number of work permit holders
Canada	Work permit holders, people with rights to settle in the UK on the basis of ancestry, students and working holidaymakers
Turkey	Some labour migrants and more recent flows of Kurdish refugees and asylum seekers
Cyprus	New EU nationals free to live and work in the UK; relatively large settled community
Portugal	EU nationals free to live and work in the UK
Iran	Settled community of refugees from the Iranian Revolution, more recently arrived asylum seekers and refugees, and work permit holders
Uganda	Older flows of settled migrants (including Asians born in Uganda); recent work permit flows and some refugees and asylum seekers

Source: Based on data from Salt and Millar 2006, Higher Education Statistics Agency, and other statistical sources

5. Socio-economic profile

The aim of this section is to present data from the LFS on the characteristics of the groups selected for analysis, arranged according to themes. Each of the tables that follow feature our 26 country-of-birth groups, including the UK-born, ranked from best performing to worst performing according to each indicator.

Economic activity

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show economic activity rates of our country-of-birth groups, ranked by different categories. Both tables exclude full-time students and people not of working age, to avoid the data being skewed by propensity to be in education or by pensioners. The data in Table 5.1 is ranked by employment rate.

Table 5.1. Employment status of working-age population by country of birth, excluding full-time students, 2005/06 (ranked by employment rate)

Rank	Country of birth	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
1	Australia	88%	3%	8%
2	France	86%	3%	12%
3=	Canada	85%	2%	13%
3=	Poland	85%	4%	11%
5=	Zimbabwe	84%	4%	11%
5=	Philippines	84%	4%	12%
5=	South Africa	84%	4%	12%
8	USA	81%	3%	16%
9	Ghana	80%	8%	12%
10	UK	78%	4%	18%
11=	Uganda	77%	6%	16%
11=	Kenya	77%	3%	20%
13	Nigeria	76%	7%	17%
14	Italy	75%	6%	19%
15	Sri Lanka	73%	5%	22%
16	Republic of Ireland	72%	3%	25%
17	India	71%	4%	25%
18	Portugal	70%	8%	22%
19=	China	69%	4%	27%
19=	Jamaica	69%	7%	24%
21	Cyprus	68%	3%	29%
22	Iran	51%	12%	36%
23	Pakistan	45%	5%	50%
24	Bangladesh	44%	8%	48%
25	Turkey	41%	7%	52%
26	Somalia	19%	10%	71%

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

While the UK currently has the highest employment rate in the G8, the Government has a target of increasing it to 80 per cent (Department for Work and Pensions 2006). Table 6 shows that nine of our country-of-birth groups in the UK already have employment rates at or above this target. However, this is not universally the case; Somalis appear at the bottom of this table with a very low employment rate of 19 per cent. This unusually low figure is indicative of the fact that the majority of Somalis in the UK will not have come here through labour migration channels, but rather because they are fleeing violence and persecution in Somalia, and of the relative newness of the Somali community, which we discuss further later in this report. Given that a large proportion of Somalis in the UK are likely to be refugees, this

low employment rate may reflect the difficulties such groups have in accessing employment once they have gained refugee status (Bloch 2004a, b).

Table 5.2 presents the same data as Table 5.1 but this time ranked by unemployment rate.

Table 5.2. Employment status of working-age population by country of birth, excluding full-time students, 2005/06 (ranked by unemployment rate)

Rank	Country of Birth	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
1	Canada	85%	2%	13%
2=	Cyprus	68%	3%	29%
2=	France	86%	3%	12%
2=	Republic of Ireland	72%	3%	25%
2=	USA	81%	3%	16%
2=	Kenya	77%	3%	20%
2=	Australia	88%	3%	8%
8=	UK	78%	4%	18%
8=	Philippines	84%	4%	12%
8=	South Africa	84%	4%	12%
8=	Zimbabwe	84%	4%	11%
8=	China	69%	4%	27%
8=	India	71%	4%	25%
8=	Poland	85%	4%	11%
15=	Sri Lanka	73%	5%	22%
15=	Pakistan	45%	5%	50%
17=	Italy	75%	6%	19%
17=	Uganda	77%	6%	16%
19=	Nigeria	76%	7%	17%
19=	Jamaica	69%	7%	24%
19=	Turkey	41%	7%	52%
22=	Bangladesh	44%	8%	48%
22=	Portugal	70%	8%	22%
22=	Ghana	80%	8%	12%
25	Somalia	19%	10%	71%
26	Iran	51%	12%	36%

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Comparing Tables 5.1 and 5.2 reveals that employment and unemployment rates do not always correspond. Some country-of-birth groups, such as the Pakistani and Cypriot born, experience low rates of employment but also low unemployment. The reason for this is the relatively high inactivity rates found in these groups.

One of the observations often made about immigrants is that they tend to be more entrepreneurial than both host-country populations and also people who stay in the home country. One of the problems with testing this claim is that entrepreneurialism is a difficult characteristic to measure. In Table 5.3 we have therefore used rates of self-employment among our country-of-birth groups as a proxy for entrepreneurialism. Note that the number of Somalis categorised as self-employed in the LFS is too small for us to be able to give a robust estimate of their self-employment rate.

Table 5.3. Self-employment rates among the economically-active working-age population, by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Self-employed
1	Turkey	35%
2	Pakistan	33%
3	Iran	31%
4	Bangladesh	21%
5	Cyprus	20%
6	Kenya	19%
7=	Canada	17%
7=	China	17%
7=	USA	17%
7=	Republic of Ireland	17%
11	Uganda	16%
12=	Jamaica	15%
12=	Italy	15%
12=	Australia	15%
15=	Poland	13%
15=	UK	13%
17	India	11%
18	South Africa	10%
19=	Nigeria	9%
19=	France	9%
19=	Sri Lanka	9%
22	Ghana	8%
23=	Portugal	7%
23=	Zimbabwe	7%
25	Philippines	3%
26	Somalia	*

* Insufficient data to make estimate that is statistically significant

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

The data reveals a wide spread of self-employment rates, with many groups significantly more likely to be self-employed than the UK born. It is interesting to pose the question of whether groups at the top of the table exhibit high rates of self-employment because they are genuinely more entrepreneurial, or whether they are diverted into self-employment due to difficulties accessing the labour market as employees. Research from Canada suggests that immigrant entrepreneurialism is determined largely by the opportunity structures of the labour market rather than by intrinsic cultural factors (Hiebert 2002).

Education

The LFS includes questions on qualifications based on equivalent National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) levels, but using these variables to assess the qualification levels of immigrants is problematic since, due to difficulties assessing the UK equivalent of overseas qualifications, foreign qualifications tend to be characterised under a general 'other qualifications' heading. As Manacorda *et al* (2006) note, when native-born respondents report holding 'other qualifications', this is generally indicative of very low-level qualifications, whereas when immigrants' qualifications are classified in this group they are often of a much higher level. This results in the qualification levels of immigrants being under-estimated. In order to avoid this problem, we have used the measure preferred by Dustmann *et al* (2007): the average age at which each of our groups left full-time education.

Table 5.4. Age when completed full-time education, by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Average leaving age
1	France	21.5
2=	USA	21.0
2=	Nigeria	21.0
2=	Canada	21.0
2=	Iran	21.0
6	Poland	20.5
7=	Philippines	20.0
7=	Ghana	20.0
9=	India	19.5
9=	South Africa	19.5
9=	China	19.5
9=	Australia	19.5
9=	Sri Lanka	19.5
9=	Uganda	19.5
15=	Kenya	19.0
15=	Zimbabwe	19.0
15=	Italy	19.0
18=	UK	17.5
18=	Republic of Ireland	17.5
18=	Pakistan	17.5
18=	Bangladesh	17.5
18=	Somalia	17.5
18=	Turkey	17.5
18=	Cyprus	17.5
25	Jamaica	17.0
26	Portugal	16.5

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

France, Nigeria, the USA, Canada, and Iran top these rankings, with average school-leaving age coming almost four years later than the UK-born average. All but eight of the foreign-born communities have higher average education leaving ages than the UK-born. Of those groups behind the UK, none lags significantly – Portuguese have the lowest average leaving age at 16.5, with the UK-born only slightly ahead at 17.5.

Hourly pay

Table 5.4 shows the average gross hourly pay of our country-of-birth groups. The data refers to respondents' main jobs only, and is only collected from respondents who are employed as opposed to self-employed. While it would be preferable to have data on the income of self-employed respondents, unfortunately this is not collected in the LFS. The self-employment rates presented in Table 5.2 should therefore be kept in mind when considering the data in Table 5.4. If we believe that self-employed people are likely to earn higher average wages than employees, those groups such as the Turkish, Pakistan and Iran-born, which have high proportions of self-employment, would likely display higher average pay rates if data on self-employed income were available.

Table 5.4. Average gross hourly pay from main job of economically-active working-age population, by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Average hourly pay
1	USA	£17.10
2	Canada	£15.60
3	Australia	£15.20
4	South Africa	£13.50
5	Uganda	£13.40
6	Republic of Ireland	£13.10
7	Kenya	£12.50
8	France	£12.30
9	Italy	£11.90
10	Cyprus	£11.70
11	Jamaica	£11.60
12	India	£11.50
13=	UK	£11.10
13=	Zimbabwe	£11.10
15	Nigeria	£10.80
16	Sri Lanka	£10.50
17	Pakistan	£10.20
18	China	£10.10
19=	Ghana	£9.40
19=	Iran	£9.40
21	Bangladesh	£9.30
22	Philippines	£8.30
23	Turkey	£8.20
24	Portugal	£8.10
25	Somalia	£7.90
26	Poland	£7.30

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

It may be tempting to conclude from Table 5.4 that the groups at the bottom of the pay rankings represent immigrants who 'undercut' UK-born workers and indeed other immigrant groups higher up the rankings. However, this conclusion is invalid since it relies on the assumption that all immigrants perform similar jobs, whereas in fact they tend to be concentrated at either end of the skills spectrum. The job for which a UK-born worker is earning an average of £11.10 an hour is unlikely to be similar to the job for which a Polish-born worker earns an average of £7.30. Similarly, Poles and Americans, who occupy opposite ends of the hourly pay scale, are unlikely to be 'competing' for jobs. Recent empirical studies conducted in the UK and the US seem to confirm that immigrants do not compete with native workers for jobs and that immigration may actually boost native workers' incomes (see, for example, Manacorda *et al* 2006, Peri 2007).

It is also interesting to compare Table 5.4 with the data in Table 5.3 on education leaving age. Groups such as the Polish-born exhibit lower than average wages (and would seem to be working largely in low-skilled employment) despite their relatively high ranking in the education table. This perhaps confirms the view that immigrants from the new EU member states are generally 'high quality migrants in low-skill jobs' (Anderson *et al* 2006: 34).

Hours worked

Table 5.5 presents data on the average weekly hours worked by our country-of-birth groups. We have excluded full-time students from this analysis because although some students may also be working in part-time jobs, their entitlement to work differs by country. UK and other

EU-born students can work as many hours as they wish, whereas international students from beyond the EU are limited to 20 hours per week.

Table 5.5. Average weekly hours worked, economically-active working-age population, by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Average hours worked
1	USA	42.0
2	Poland	41.5
3	South Africa	41.0
4	Australia	40.5
5=	France	40.0
5=	Zimbabwe	40.0
7=	Philippines	39.5
7=	Canada	39.5
7=	Uganda	39.5
10=	India	38.5
10=	Nigeria	38.5
10=	Italy	38.5
10=	Cyprus	38.5
10=	Portugal	38.5
15	Kenya	38.0
16=	China	37.5
16=	Sri Lanka	37.5
18	Republic of Ireland	37.0
19=	UK	36.5
19=	Pakistan	36.5
19=	Jamaica	36.5
19=	Ghana	35.5
23	Turkey	35.0
24	Iran	34.0
25	Somalia	33.0
26	Bangladesh	32.0

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

It is perhaps not surprising that Poles come joint top of the hours-worked rankings, given the survey evidence that suggests that they are highly valued for their work ethic (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 2005, Eaglesham 2007). That Poles share the top position with Americans suggests that the long-hours culture that exists in the US remains a feature of Americans' lives even when they live overseas. Other country-of-birth groups that feature towards the top of Table 5.5 include those that are represented strongly in public service employment, such as the Philippines.

Annual income

Combining Tables 5.4 and 5.5 allows us to make estimates of average gross annual incomes for each of our groups. This is shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6. Estimated average gross annual income of economically-active working-age population by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Average annual income
1	USA	£37,250
2	Canada	£32,000
3	Australia	£31,850
4	South Africa	£28,800
5	Uganda	£27,400
6	France	£25,600
7	Republic of Ireland	£25,100
8	Kenya	£24,500
9	Italy	£23,800
10=	India	£23,200
10=	Cyprus	£23,200
12	Zimbabwe	£23,100
13	Jamaica	£22,050
14	Nigeria	£21,600
15	UK	£21,250
16	Sri Lanka	£20,500
17	China	£19,700
18	Pakistan	£19,450
19	Ghana	£17,300
20	Philippines	£17,000
21	Iran	£16,450
22	Portugal	£16,250
23	Poland	£15,750
24	Bangladesh	£15,550
25	Turkey	£14,750
26	Somalia	£13,700

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Wealth

In addition to income and other employment variables, it is also important to consider the comparative wealth of our country-of-birth groups. Since home ownership is a major source of wealth, it makes sense to use the data available in the LFS on housing tenure. Other possible indicators of wealth might include car ownership, but since migrants tend to be found concentrated in cities, it is perhaps not such a good indicator since car ownership is generally lower in cities than in areas with little public transport provision.

Data on home ownership is presented in Table 5.7. One problem with this data is that many of the groups with high proportions of ownership are relatively settled, whereas those who rent are either new or highly mobile groups, such as Poles. In the case of the Polish-born, house ownership may be determined not only by whether migrants can afford to buy, but also linked to the short-term nature of their migration to the UK. Polish migrants may not see the need to invest in buying a house and prefer instead to rent, perhaps also saving up to pay for a house back home. In order to present a more balanced picture of house ownership, Table 5.7 therefore includes only those people living in the UK since before 2000. Note that we cannot state the proportion of the Somali-born group who fall into the owned outright or buying categories due to sample size problems. Nevertheless, the combined figure given for this group is statistically significant.

Table 5.7. Home ownership of people resident in the UK since before 2000, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Owned outright	Being bought with mortgage or loan	Total owned or buying
1	India	37%	49%	86%
2	Kenya	25%	57%	82%
3	Canada	35%	42%	77%
4	Australia	20%	56%	76%
5=	USA	25%	51%	75%
5=	Pakistan	33%	42%	75%
5=	Cyprus	31%	44%	75%
5=	China	29%	45%	75%
5=	UK	27%	48%	75%
10	Italy	47%	27%	74%
11=	South Africa	19%	52%	71%
11=	Republic of Ireland	39%	32%	71%
13=	Sri Lanka	13%	56%	69%
13=	Uganda	23%	46%	69%
15=	Poland	46%	21%	67%
15=	France	25%	42%	67%
17	Zimbabwe	12%	52%	64%
18	Philippines	13%	49%	62%
19	Iran	11%	50%	61%
20	Jamaica	25%	32%	57%
21=	Bangladesh	13%	37%	50%
21=	Nigeria	8%	41%	50%
23	Ghana	7%	30%	38%
24	Portugal	9%	28%	37%
25	Turkey	5%	29%	35%
26	Somalia	*	*	4%

* Insufficient data to make estimate that is statistically significant

Note: Percentages may not sum due to rounding

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

The country-of-birth group with the highest combined rate of house ownership or mortgage possession is the Indian-born. Other groups, such as the Italian and Polish-born, also have high rates of outright ownership. In the Polish case, this is in contrast to more recent arrivals, who are much more likely to be renting, as discussed above. For some country-of-birth groups, housing tenure is likely to be determined partly by cultural factors since home ownership varies widely between countries (see Scanlon and Whitehead 2004).

Income tax and National Insurance contributions

Table 5.8 presents data on the average weekly income tax and National Insurance contributions (including employee and employer contributions) paid by our country-of-birth groups. These have been calculated using a tax model that works out the amount of tax and NI paid on individual gross weekly incomes, as reported in the LFS. Once again, we need to bear in mind that income data is not collected from the self-employed and therefore this data only relates to those respondents who are employees. Furthermore, the data clearly only applies to those people who are in employment and, as established earlier, there is significant variation in economic activity rates between groups.

Table 5.8. Average weekly tax and NI contributions from main job of economically-active working-age population, by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Average weekly tax	Average weekly NI	Total
1	USA	£160.90	£120.60	£281.60
2	Canada	£140.30	£112.90	£253.20
3	Australia	£114.90	£99.00	£213.90
4	South Africa	£101.60	£92.20	£193.80
5	Uganda	£97.90	£88.30	£186.20
6	France	£89.40	£85.20	£174.60
7	Republic of Ireland	£89.10	£85.50	£174.50
8	Kenya	£88.00	£82.80	£170.80
9	India	£84.30	£77.90	£162.10
10	Italy	£79.10	£79.40	£158.40
11	Zimbabwe	£72.80	£75.80	£148.60
12	Jamaica	£70.00	£74.10	£144.20
13	Cyprus	£68.70	£73.70	£142.40
14	UK	£70.30	£70.30	£140.60
15	Nigeria	£66.30	£70.20	£136.50
16	Sri Lanka	£66.70	£67.20	£133.90
17	Pakistan	£64.00	£60.60	£124.60
18	China	£58.90	£62.80	£121.70
19	Ghana	£55.20	£58.90	£114.10
20	Bangladesh	£55.10	£50.10	£105.20
21	Iran	£49.60	£51.80	£101.40
22	Philippines	£45.90	£54.10	£100.10
23	Poland	£44.90	£49.60	£94.40
24	Somalia	£41.00	£48.60	£89.60
25	Portugal	£41.00	£48.00	£89.00
26	Turkey	£41.60	£47.30	£88.90

Note: Income tax figures assume work at a consistent weekly rate across the tax year

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

In many ways the rankings in Table 5.8 resemble those for average hourly pay, but there are some differences. The long hours worked by Poles partly counteract their relatively low average hourly pay and push them up the tax-paid rankings to some extent. We also see some movement of other groups due to differences in the distribution of income within the groups.

Benefit claims

One of the primary public concerns around migration is the belief that immigrants are a drain on the public purse, despite research evidence that suggests otherwise (Gott and Johnston 2002, Sriskandarajah *et al* 2005). In the lead-up to EU enlargement in 2004, for example, much of the media attention was focused on the possibility of migrants from the new member states coming to the UK solely to claim benefits. Even post-enlargement, there have been claims that these migrants are a drain on the public purse, with the *Daily Express* claiming that they are 'costing the taxpayer £77 million a year' (Whitehead 2007). The following tables present data on unemployment-related benefits, Income Support, sickness or disability benefits, and Child Benefit.

Table 5.9 shows the proportion of each of our groups claiming unemployment-related benefits, defined as Jobseeker's Allowance and National Insurance credits.

Table 5.9. Proportion of population claiming unemployment-related benefits by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Unemployment-related benefits
1=	Poland	†
1=	USA	†
1=	Australia	†
1=	South Africa	†
5=	Nigeria	1%
5=	India	1%
5=	Sri Lanka	1%
5=	Kenya	1%
5=	Canada	1%
5=	France	1%
5=	Republic of Ireland	1%
5=	Philippines	1%
5=	Jamaica	1%
5=	UK	1%
5=	Zimbabwe	1%
16=	Cyprus	2%
16=	China	2%
16=	Pakistan	2%
16=	Italy	2%
16=	Portugal	2%
21=	Ghana	3%
21=	Uganda	3%
23	Turkey	4%
24=	Bangladesh	5%
24=	Somalia	5%
24=	Iran	5%

† Rounds to zero

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

The table reveals that even where there is a relatively high level of unemployment among some groups, the proportion of people who claim unemployment-related benefits is very low. For example, while 4 per cent of the Polish and South African-born populations are unemployed, the proportion of those populations claiming unemployment benefits rounds to zero. This is likely to be because of ineligibility for benefits, whereas some of the groups with higher proportions claiming unemployment benefits are likely to be naturalised British citizens.

Table 5.10 presents data on the proportion of each of our country-of-birth groups claiming Income Support. Income support is a means-tested benefit that can be claimed by people between the ages of 16 and 60 who are not working full-time and are on low incomes, and who are either lone parents, sick or disabled, caring for another person, or registered blind.

Table 5.10. Proportion of population claiming Income Support by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Income support
1	USA	†
2=	Philippines	1%
2=	Poland	1%
2=	France	1%
2=	Australia	1%
6=	Canada	2%
6=	South Africa	2%
6=	China	2%
9=	Zimbabwe	3%
9=	Ghana	3%
9=	Italy	3%
9=	Sri Lanka	3%
9=	Kenya	3%
9=	India	3%
15	UK	4%
16=	Republic of Ireland	5%
16=	Nigeria	5%
18	Jamaica	6%
19=	Uganda	7%
19=	Portugal	7%
21	Cyprus	9%
22	Iran	10%
23=	Pakistan	11%
23=	Bangladesh	11%
25	Turkey	21%
26	Somalia	39%

† Rounds to zero

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Of all of the groups, those born in the US, the Philippines, Poland, France and Australia are the least likely to be claiming Income Support. Somalis are the most likely to be claiming it, due to the high incidence of poverty among this group. It is interesting to compare these figures with those for the (largely UK-born) population of some of the UK's most deprived areas. For example, in the 15 per cent most deprived areas of Scotland, more than 40 per cent of children are dependent on a parent or guardian who is in receipt of Income Support (Scottish Executive 2005). Significantly, though, the majority of groups have lower income support take-up rates than the UK-born. Of the groups with higher rates of Income Support claims, many are likely to be recognised refugees or naturalised British citizens. Table 5.11 presents data on sickness and disability benefit claims by country of birth. This includes payments such as Incapacity Benefit and other benefits paid to people who are unable to work because of a long-term health problem or disability.

Table 5.11. Proportion of population claiming sickness or disability benefits by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Sickness or disability benefits
1	Poland	†
2=	Philippines	1%
2=	USA	1%
2=	France	1%
2=	Nigeria	1%
2=	Portugal	1%
2=	Zimbabwe	1%
8=	China	2%
8=	Australia	2%
8=	Ghana	2%
8=	South Africa	2%
8=	Italy	2%
8=	Sri Lanka	2%
14	Canada	4%
15=	Uganda	5%
15=	Iran	5%
15=	India	5%
18	Turkey	6%
19=	Bangladesh	6%
19=	UK	6%
21	Somalia	7%
22=	Jamaica	8%
22=	Republic of Ireland	8%
22=	Kenya	8%
25	Cyprus	9%
26	Pakistan	10%

† Rounds to zero

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

The variations between country-of-birth groups in Table 5.11 are narrower than is the case for Income Support, but there are still substantial differences. Polish-born people are unlikely to be claiming any form of disability benefit, which reflects both their ineligibility for many of these benefits and the generally youthful nature of this group. Irish-born people, by contrast, with the highest average age of the groups studied in this report at 56 years, have a greater tendency to claim benefits available to people with a long-term sickness or disability. Other groups with relatively high rates of disability include settled communities such as the Pakistani and Cypriot born. In 2001, according to the Census, 30 per cent of Irish-born people in England and Wales had a limiting long-term illness (LLTI). Twenty-three per cent of the Pakistani born and 25.3 per cent of the Cypriot-born had LLTIs. This compares with 18.2 per cent of the UK-born population.

Table 5.12 presents data on the proportion of each country-of-birth group who are in receipt of Child Benefit, a flat-rate monthly payment made to people bringing up a child. Entitlement to Child Benefit is generally restricted to those people who are not subject to immigration control. This means that non-European Economic Area (EEA) nationals, whose immigration status is dependent on them not having recourse to public funds, do not generally qualify, unless they are from a country with which the UK has reciprocal agreements on Child Benefit.

Table 5.12. Proportion of population claiming Child Benefit by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Child benefit
1	USA	10%
2=	Poland	12%
2=	Republic of Ireland	12%
3=	China	13%
3=	Australia	13%
3=	Italy	13%
3=	South Africa	13%
8	UK	14%
9=	Canada	16%
9=	France	16%
9=	Zimbabwe	16%
9=	Jamaica	16%
9=	India	16%
14	Philippines	17%
15	Cyprus	20%
16	Iran	20%
17	Sri Lanka	21%
18	Nigeria	22%
19=	Ghana	24%
19=	Kenya	24%
21	Uganda	25%
22	Turkey	26%
23	Portugal	27%
24	Pakistan	29%
25	Bangladesh	33%
26	Somalia	40%

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Because Child Benefit is available, obviously, to people with children, the proportion of each country-of-birth group in receipt of this benefit is affected by the groups' age and family structures. The group with the highest proportion claiming Child Benefit is the Somali-born, who have an average age of 31 and are the youngest of the country-of-birth groups featured here. The second and third highest proportions are found in the Bangladeshi and Pakistani-born groups, which tend to have larger family sizes than the national average. At the other end of the spectrum, the American-born are the least likely to qualify for Child Benefit, Polish-born people are less likely to have families in the UK and are therefore unlikely to qualify, and the high average age of the Irish-born means that a small proportion of this group have dependent children and again they are therefore unlikely to qualify. People born outside of the EEA who are claiming Child Benefit are likely to be naturalised British citizens.

Social housing

Many of the tensions that occur around immigration are to do with resource allocation. While there is substantial evidence to suggest that people will accept inequality in resource allocation (such as particular groups being provided with more access to a resource than other groups) providing that the procedure for regulating access to these resources is fair (Pearce 2007), tensions often arise when there is a scarcity of resources. One such scarce resource is social housing. While non-EEA nationals are generally not eligible for social housing, there has been considerable debate about the way in which housing is allocated, with the Barking MP Margaret Hodge recently calling for housing policy to favour UK-born citizens over migrants rather than basing allocation on need (Hodge 2007).

Table 5.13 shows the proportion of each country-of-birth group living in social housing. Note that this data is for entire country-of-birth populations, rather than just those people who arrived before 2000, as is the case for Table 5.7.

Table 5.13. Proportion of population living in social housing, by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Living in local authority or housing association housing
1=	Australia	5%
1=	France	5%
1=	USA	5%
4=	Poland	8%
4=	India	8%
4=	South Africa	8%
4=	Canada	8%
8	China	9%
9	Italy	10%
10	Kenya	12%
11	Sri Lanka	14%
12=	Pakistan	15%
12=	Philippines	15%
14	Cyprus	16%
15	UK	17%
16	Zimbabwe	20%
17=	Republic of Ireland	21%
17=	Uganda	21%
19	Nigeria	29%
20	Iran	33%
21	Jamaica	35%
22	Ghana	39%
23	Portugal	40%
24	Bangladesh	41%
25	Turkey	49%
26	Somalia	80%

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

The table reveals that 14 of our country-of-birth groups are less likely to be living in social housing than the UK-born population. Of those groups that are more likely to be living in social housing than the UK-born, many are eligible on the grounds that they are naturalised British citizens or, in the case of the Somali and Turkish-born, recognised refugees.

Contribution to public services

Table 5.14 shows the proportion of the economically-active working-age population working in public service jobs, defined as employment in public administration and defence, education, health and social work, and other community, social and personal service employment.³ Because the data in the table is broken down to a high level of detail, some of the industry division data is not listed due to small sample sizes. However, the figures in the 'total public services' column are all statistically significant.

³ The other community, social and personal service employment category includes people working in a diverse range of jobs including librarians, recreation centre staff and museum staff.

Table 5.14. Proportion of workforce employed in public services among the economically-active working-age population, by country of birth, 2005/06

Rank	Country of birth	Public administration and defence	Education	Health and social work	Other community, social and personal	Total public services
1	Philippines	5%	4%	49%	*	60%
2=	Jamaica	7%	8%	29%	6%	50%
2=	Nigeria	9%	8%	27%	7%	50%
4	Zimbabwe	6%	6%	33%	4%	49%
5	Somalia	*	*	30%	*	48%
6	Canada	7%	13%	13%	12%	46%
7	Ghana	7%	5%	24%	4%	40%
8	Cyprus	8%	13%	10%	8%	39%
9=	Republic of Ireland	5%	10%	19%	4%	38%
9=	Australia	8%	9%	13%	8%	38%
11	Uganda	7%	6%	22%	*	37%
12	USA	8%	13%	5%	11%	36%
13	South Africa	5%	9%	15%	6%	35%
14=	UK	8%	9%	12%	5%	34%
14=	India	4%	6%	20%	4%	34%
16	Kenya	7%	8%	14%	5%	33%
17	France	5%	15%	6%	5%	31%
18	Italy	3%	10%	10%	5%	29%
19	China	3%	9%	11%	5%	28%
20	Iran	*	10%	*	*	24%
21	Portugal	*	6%	10%	7%	23%
22	Sri Lanka	6%	4%	11%	*	22%
23	Bangladesh	5%	3%	10%	*	20%
24	Pakistan	3%	5%	9%	2%	19%
25	Poland	*	2%	7%	5%	14%
26	Turkey	*	*	*	*	11%

* Insufficient data to be able to make estimate that is statistically significant

Note: Percentages may not sum due to rounding

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the importance of foreign-born staff to the NHS (see Kelly *et al* 2005), the 'health and social work' category accounts for a large proportion of most groups' total employment. The dominance of healthcare employment is particularly pronounced for those born in the Philippines, 49 per cent of whom work in this sector. Some groups also feature significantly in the education sector: the American, Canadian and French-born, for example. This may be because relatively high numbers of people from these countries work as university lecturers or professors, or as language teachers in the case of the French-born group.

6. Trends over time

In the previous section we presented a snapshot of the characteristics of each community relative to other communities, looking only at immigrants (people born overseas) rather than descendents of recent immigrants. But what happens to the characteristics and contributions of immigrants and their descendents? Unfortunately, building this sort of dynamic picture is difficult, due to the lack of data sources that go far enough back. This also means that predicting what happens in the future is very difficult because we do not know exactly what trends are present.

In this section, we attempt to overcome some of these difficulties by looking at other sources of data in order to build a picture of what happens to immigrant communities over time. We do this by drawing on three types of data: data from the LFS that compares progress of immigrant communities over time, data on ethnic groups, and data on the educational attainment of the children of selected immigrant communities that includes children who were born in the UK as well as overseas. Each is discussed in turn below.

Data on immigrant characteristics over time

In order to give some indication of how the socio-economic profiles of our country-of-birth groups have changed over time, this section presents some data from the LFS from 1995 and 1996. Of course, since those years, the composition of communities will have changed. Data showing that the unemployment rate among a certain country-of-birth group has risen or fallen, for example, does not necessarily imply that those members of the community present in 1995/96 are more or less likely to be unemployed in 2005/06 (although that may well be the case) – rather, it could be that the community has grown and newcomers are more or less likely to be unemployed than their more established counterparts.

Table 6.1 presents data on the estimated size of our selected country-of-birth groups in 1996 Q4, alongside their size in 2006 Q4.

Table 6.1. Selected country-of-birth group sizes, 1996 Q4 and 2006 Q4 (cont. next page)

Country of birth	1996 Q4		2006 Q4	
	Estimated group size	Percentage of total population	Estimated group size	Percentage of total population
UK	53,383,150	93.22	52,980,100	89.93
India	387,600	0.68	578,600	0.98
Republic of Ireland	563,050	0.98	425,300	0.72
Poland	54,100	0.09	318,600	0.54
Pakistan	219,500	0.38	306,400	0.52
Bangladesh	143,950	0.25	208,900	0.35
South Africa	96,100	0.17	189,900	0.32
USA	120,900	0.21	183,700	0.31
Jamaica	131,450	0.23	162,650	0.28
Nigeria	59,350	0.10	146,300	0.25
China	88,300	0.15	144,050	0.24
Kenya	114,300	0.20	123,600	0.21
Australia	80,200	0.14	120,250	0.20
France	61,550	0.11	117,300	0.20
Zimbabwe	30,000	0.05	103,650	0.18
Sri Lanka	33,250	0.06	102,950	0.17
Philippines	27,850	0.05	99,650	0.17
Italy	80,900	0.14	98,950	0.17
Ghana	43,650	0.08	96,650	0.16
Somalia	31,300	0.05	82,300	0.14
Canada	61,450	0.11	75,000	0.13
Turkey	47,300	0.08	69,400	0.12
Cyprus	61,900	0.11	64,300	0.11

Portugal	18,050	0.03	62,200	0.11
Iran	30,950	0.05	60,900	0.10
Uganda	44,650	0.08	60,350	0.10

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

The table reveals that 24 of our 25 foreign-born groups grew in size between 1996 Q4 and 2006 Q4, with only the Irish-born group shrinking. Growth has been far from even though, with large percentage increases in the number of Polish, Filipino, Portuguese, Zimbabwean and Sri Lankan-born people, in contrast to much smaller growth among the Cypriot and Kenyan-born.

Table 6.2 presents data on economic activity rates in 1995/96 alongside the data for 2005/06 from Table 6.1 above. One important point to note when comparing data for the two periods is that the overall economic situation of the country improved in the intervening years, and we would therefore expect the overall employment rate to rise and the unemployment rate to fall.

Table 6.2. Employment status of working-age population by country of birth, excluding full-time students, 1995/96 and 2005/06 (ranked by employment rate)

1995/96					2005/06				
Rank	Country of birth	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive	Rank	Country of birth	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
1	Canada	80%	7%	13%	1	Australia	88%	3%	8%
2	Australia	78%	7%	15%	2	France	86%	3%	12%
3=	South Africa	77%	7%	16%	3=	Canada	85%	2%	13%
3=	Zimbabwe	77%	7%	16%	3=	Poland	85%	4%	11%
3=	Italy	77%	6%	17%	5=	Zimbabwe	84%	4%	11%
6=	France	76%	6%	18%	5=	Philippines	84%	4%	12%
6=	Uganda	76%	10%	14%	5=	South Africa	84%	4%	12%
6=	Kenya	76%	6%	18%	8	USA	81%	3%	16%
9	UK	75%	6%	19%	9	Ghana	80%	8%	12%
10=	USA	72%	6%	22%	10	UK	78%	4%	18%
10=	Sri Lanka	72%	4%	25%	11=	Uganda	77%	6%	16%
12=	Ghana	71%	11%	18%	11=	Kenya	77%	3%	20%
12=	China	71%	5%	24%	13	Nigeria	76%	7%	17%
14=	Philippines	67%	7%	25%	14	Italy	75%	6%	19%
14=	Republic of Ireland	67%	8%	26%	15	Sri Lanka	73%	5%	22%
16	Portugal	66%	9%	25%	16	Republic of Ireland	72%	3%	25%
17	India	65%	6%	29%	17	India	71%	4%	25%
18=	Nigeria	64%	18%	18%	18	Portugal	70%	8%	22%
19=	Jamaica	64%	10%	26%	19=	China	69%	4%	27%
20	Poland	62%	13%	25%	19=	Jamaica	69%	7%	24%
21	Cyprus	60%	11%	30%	21	Cyprus	68%	3%	29%
22	Iran	51%	17%	32%	22	Iran	51%	12%	36%
23	Turkey	40%	14%	46%	23	Pakistan	45%	5%	50%
24	Pakistan	39%	10%	51%	24	Bangladesh	44%	8%	48%
25	Bangladesh	31%	15%	54%	25	Turkey	41%	7%	52%
26	Somalia	12%	24%	63%	26	Somalia	19%	10%	71%

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Table 6.3 presents data on the average gross hourly pay of our country-of-birth groups in 1995/96 along with the data presented in Section 5 above for 2005/06. Once again, we need to bear in mind the changing economic situation over the past ten years, during which there has been both nominal and real wage growth. The average hourly wage in the 1995/96 LFS dataset is £7.40, compared to £11.20 in the 2005/06 dataset – representing nominal wage growth of around 51 per cent over the period. Using the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), we can express 1995/96 wages in 2005/06 prices. The average hourly wage of £7.40 in 1995/96 is equivalent to £8.50 in 2005/06 prices. The difference between £8.50 and £11.20 therefore represents real wage growth.

Table 6.3. Average gross hourly pay from main job of economically-active working-age population, by country of birth, 1995/96 and 2005/06

1995/96				2005/06		
Rank	Country of birth	Average hourly pay	In 2005/06 prices	Rank	Country of birth	Average hourly pay
1	USA	£12.50	£14.50	1	USA	£17.10
2	South Africa	£10.30	£12.00	2	Canada	£15.60
3	Canada	£10.10	£11.70	3	Australia	£15.20
4	France	£9.90	£11.50	4	South Africa	£13.50
5	China	£9.30	£10.80	5	Uganda	£13.40
6	Poland	£9.10	£10.60	6	Republic of Ireland	£13.10
7	Sri Lanka	£8.20	£9.50	7	Kenya	£12.50
8	Zimbabwe	£8.00	£9.30	8	France	£12.30
9	Nigeria	£7.90	£9.10	9	Italy	£11.90
10=	Kenya	£7.80	£9.00	10	Cyprus	£11.70
10=	Australia	£7.80	£9.10	11	Jamaica	£11.60
12	Portugal	£7.70	£8.90	12	India	£11.50
13	Cyprus	£7.60	£8.80	13=	UK	£11.10
14	Republic of Ireland	£7.40	£8.60	13=	Zimbabwe	£11.10
15	UK	£7.30	£8.50	15	Nigeria	£10.80
16=	Iran	£7.20	£8.30	16	Sri Lanka	£10.50
16=	Uganda	£7.20	£8.40	17	Pakistan	£10.20
18	India	£6.90	£8.10	18	China	£10.10
19	Ghana	£6.80	£7.90	19=	Ghana	£9.40
20	Pakistan	£6.70	£7.80	19=	Iran	£9.40
21	Italy	£6.50	£7.60	21	Bangladesh	£9.30
22	Jamaica	£6.40	£7.40	22	Philippines	£8.30
23	Turkey	£6.00	£7.00	23	Turkey	£8.20
24	Philippines	£5.20	£6.10	24	Portugal	£8.10
25	Bangladesh	£3.90	£4.50	25	Somalia	£7.90
26	Somalia	*	*	26	Poland	£7.30

* Insufficient data to make estimate that is statistically significant

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

It is clear from the table that there has been a narrowing of the gap between the groups with the highest and lowest average pay over the last ten years. In 1995/96, the average American-born worker was paid some 3.2 times as much per hour as a Bangladeshi-born person. In 2005/06, American born people were paid 2.3 times as much on average as Polish-born workers. (We have compared the Bangladeshi and Polish-born groups as they were in similar low-ranking positions for the two sets of years.) There has also been significant movement in the rankings, with the Polish-born slipping downwards most significantly. It is important to note that the Polish-born community in 1995/96 was largely composed of people who had been resident in the UK a long time, whereas the current Polish-born group is largely composed of recently arrived labour migrants. Likewise, China's slide down the rankings is likely to reflect the fact that recent migrants from this group were born in mainland China, rather than Hong Kong, the birthplace of many previous Chinese-born people in the UK.

The Ugandan, Italian, Jamaican and Indian-born groups all moved above the ranking of the UK-born group between 1995/96 and 2005/06. Other groups, such as the Bangladeshi-born, make some progress in terms of moving away from the bottom of the rankings.

Ethnicity data

One way to take into account the characteristics of descendants of immigrants together with immigrants themselves is to look at groups as defined by ethnicity rather than country of birth. This has the potential to be useful because a broad ethnic category such as Asian or Asian British (Indian) should include people of Indian descent as well as people born in India.

There are, however, major problems with this approach. One is that there are just 15 main ethnic categories under which all countries of birth are grouped. Ethnic categories such as 'black African' fail to capture the differences between those born in countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia. Comparing ethnic groups with country-of-birth groups is also problematic because some countries' populations may contain multiple ethnic groups. For example, people born in Kenya may be of black, white or Asian ethnicity. People born in highly developed, multicultural countries such as the US or Australia may be of any number of ethnic groups. Furthermore, the large portion of immigrants who are white are all categorised under one heading, 'other white', and their descendants are likely to identify themselves as 'white British', making them undistinguishable from the 'native' population, whereas their non-white counterparts are distinguishable from the white population. This is problematic given that the largest region of origin of foreign-born people living in the UK is Europe (Rendall and Salt 2005), and that the majority of this group are white.

Bearing these issues in mind, we present data on selected characteristics of ethnic groups taken from the LFS. Table 6.4 shows the estimated size of each ethnic group.

Table 6.4. Estimated size of ethnic groups in the UK, 2006 Q4

Ethnic group	Estimated group size	Percentage of total population
White		
White British	48,162,000	84.2%
Other white	3,210,150	5.6%
Mixed		
Mixed white and black Caribbean	222,200	0.4%
Mixed white and black African	76,250	0.1%
Mixed white and Asian	147,550	0.3%
Other mixed	155,550	0.3%
Asian or Asian British		
Indian	1,168,100	2.0%
Pakistani	871,050	1.5%
Bangladeshi	301,600	0.5%
Other Asian	382,600	0.7%
Black or black British		
Black Caribbean	647,650	1.1%
Black African	722,500	1.3%
Other black	50,350	0.1%
Other		
Chinese	197,950	0.4%
Other	886,850	1.6%

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Table 6.5 shows economic activity rates by ethnic group, using the same methodology for producing the tables on activity rates by country of birth.

Table 6.5. Employment status of working-age population, by ethnic group, excluding full-time students, 2005/06

Ethnic group	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
White			
White British	79%	4%	18%
Other white	78%	4%	18%
Mixed			
Mixed white and black Caribbean	65%	11%	24%
Mixed white and black African	74%	9%	18%
Mixed white and Asian	78%	5%	18%
Other mixed	75%	6%	18%
Asian or Asian British			
Indian	75%	5%	20%
Pakistani	49%	7%	43%
Bangladeshi	45%	9%	45%
Other Asian	68%	6%	25%
Black or black British			
Black Caribbean	70%	9%	21%
Black African	66%	9%	25%
Other black	74%	10%	16%
Other			
Chinese	73%	5%	23%
Other	62%	7%	31%

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding; Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Economic activity rates vary considerably according to ethnicity as they do with country of birth, but there is not necessarily a correlation between low levels of employment and high levels of unemployment, given variations in inactivity rates. People of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity have higher inactivity rates than people of other ethnicities, whereas black/black British people tend to experience higher unemployment rates than they do inactivity rates. The two white categories – white British and other white – are characterised by very similar economic activity rates to one another.

Table 6.6 shows rates of self-employment among the 15 ethnicity groups in the LFS.

Table 6.6. Self-employment rates among the economically active working-age population, by ethnic group, 2005/06

Ethnic group	Self-employed
White	
White British	13%
Other white	15%
Mixed	
Mixed white and black Caribbean	11%
Mixed white and black African	6%
Mixed white and Asian	12%
Other mixed	14%
Asian or Asian British	
Indian	11%
Pakistani	27%
Bangladeshi	13%
Other Asian	15%
Black or black British	
Black Caribbean	11%
Black African	7%
Other black	11%
Other	
Chinese	17%
Other	14%

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

The highest self-employment rate is to be found among people of Pakistani ethnicity. This is perhaps not surprising given that the Pakistani-born also feature towards the top of the self-employment rankings. It is interesting to note that people of Bangladeshi ethnicity regardless of their place of birth are significantly less likely to be self-employed than people born in Bangladesh (13 per cent versus 21 per cent), perhaps indicating that the children and grandchildren of Bangladeshi immigrants find it easier to access the labour market than their parents or grandparents. Gold *et al* (2006) call this the 'classic model of generational succession in self-employment'.

It is interesting to compare this situation with that of many second-generation immigrants in the US, who appear to maintain similar rates of self-employment as their parents despite the predictions of the classic model (Gold *et al* 2006). It seems likely that the decline in self-employment across generations in the UK may be the result of higher educational attainment among the children of immigrants in comparison to their parents, meaning that the children find it easier to access the labour market (Clark and Drinkwater 2006).

Table 6.7 shows the average age at which people leave full-time education, by ethnic group.

Table 6.7. Age when completed full-time education, by ethnic group, 2005/06

Ethnic group	Average leaving age
White	
White British	17.5
Other white	19.0
Mixed	
Mixed white and black Caribbean	17.0
Mixed white and black African	18.0
Mixed white and Asian	18.5
Other mixed	19.0
Asian or Asian British	
Indian	19.5
Pakistani	18.0
Bangladeshi	17.5
Other Asian	19.5
Black or black British	
Black Caribbean	17.5
Black African	19.5
Other black	19.0
Other	
Chinese	20.0
Other	19.5

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Here, there is significant variation between the white British and other white ethnic groups, with people classified as other white leaving full-time education an average of 1.5 years later than their white British counterparts. The group with the highest leaving age is of people of Chinese ethnicity. Only people of mixed white and black Caribbean ethnicity have a lower average leaving age than white British people according to our calculations.

Finally, Table 6.8 shows gross average hourly pay, by ethnicity.

Table 6.8. Average gross hourly pay from main job of economically-active working-age population, by ethnic group, 2005/06

Ethnic group	Average hourly pay
White	
White British	£11.20
Other white	£11.90
Mixed	
Mixed white and black Caribbean	£9.50
Mixed white and black African	£9.90
Mixed white and Asian	£12.00
Other mixed	£12.10
Asian or Asian British	
Indian	£11.70
Pakistani	£9.60
Bangladeshi	£9.40
Other Asian	£10.00
Black or black British	
Black Caribbean	£11.40
Black African	£9.50
Other black	£10.20
Other	
Chinese	£11.10
Other	£10.50

Source: LFS and ippr calculations

Unsurprisingly given the size and breadth of the ethnicity groups, there is less variation in hourly pay according to ethnicity than there is according to country of birth. The lowest average earners are people of Bangladeshi ethnicity, and the highest those of 'other mixed' ethnicity.

Several observations can be made from these data on ethnic groups:

- The Chinese ethnic group do relatively better than the Chinese-born group alone. In other words, when British-born people of Chinese descent and people of Chinese descent born in other countries around the world are added to the Chinese-born, the socio-economic performance of this group improves significantly.
- There are differences between UK-born and non-UK-born ethnic minority groups. Asian Pakistani and Asian Bangladeshi ethnic groups seem to have consistently low rankings in the data when presented by ethnic group. This may suggest that even the British-born descendents of this group share some similar characteristics.
- The 'mixed' category, which gets entirely overlooked when looking at country-of-birth group, seems to be doing relatively well on some criteria and relatively poorly on others. There is also considered variation between different mixed ethnicity groups. People of mixed white and Asian ethnicity have the highest average rates of pay of all groups, whereas people of mixed white and black Caribbean ethnicity perform relatively poorly in the labour market.

Children of immigrants

Table 6.9 presents data on the educational performance of children, by ethnic group. Test results including GCSE statistics were used to calculate a mean percentage difference from the mean score in English schools. Unfortunately statistics are not available for all ethnicities.

Table 6.9. School performance, by ethnic group, 2003

Ethnic group	Mean percentage difference from England mean
Chinese	+11.0
Sri Lankan	+8.0
Indian	+7.0
Iranian	+5.0
Irish	+4.5
Filipino	+4.5
French	+3.0
Nigerian	+1.5
White British	+1.0
Ghanaian	-0.8
Italian	-1.0
Cypriot	-5.5
Bangladeshi	-9.3
Pakistani	-11.3
Jamaican	-15.3
Somali	-22.8
Turkish	-23.6
Portuguese	-32.3

Source: DfES and ippr calculations

A more detailed analysis of data shows that there are big differences between male and female school achievement among some communities, but much smaller differences among others. Among white British children, 60.1 per cent of girls achieve five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C, compared with 50.2 per cent of boys – a gap of some 10 percentage points. Among African-Caribbean children, the gender gap is around 16 percentage points (Department for Education and Skills 2006). It is also high among ethnic-Turkish pupils. Among Somali pupils there was little or no gender gap in the mid 1990s, but now girls are achieving much higher results than boys. The gender gap appears to be increasing among all communities, at least up to GCSE.

This gender gap complicates any assessment of the relative performance of pupils as measured by ethnic group, as do factors such as social class and family income. Demie states that '[g]ender is strongly associated with achievement regardless of ethnic background' (2001: 103), and also notes that ethnic background does not in itself presuppose educational outcomes, with significant variation within as well as between groups.

One of the ways in which researchers have attempted to understand educational performance along ethnicity lines while controlling for economic background has been to use data limited to those pupils who are eligible for free school meals, which is a good indicator of low family incomes. Table 6.10 presents data on the proportion of children in England who achieve five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C, by ethnicity, and by eligibility for free schools meals.

Table 6.10. Proportion of pupils achieving five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C, by ethnic group and eligibility for free school meals, 2005

Ethnic group	All pupils	In receipt of free school meals	Not in receipt of free school meals
White	55.1%	25.6%	59.0%
White British	55.0%	25.1%	58.8%
Irish	62.6%	33.1%	68.7%
Traveller of Irish Heritage	22.5%	7.1%	31.9%
Gypsy/Roma	14.7%	9.9%	18.7%
Any other white background	58.9%	37.9%	63.7%
Mixed	54.6%	35.1%	60.1%
White and black Caribbean	44.1%	32.2%	48.4%
White and black African	55.5%	38.8%	61.4%
White and Asian	67.4%	39.2%	72.2%
Any other mixed background	58.6%	36.4%	64.1%
Asian	58.7%	46.0%	64.2%
Indian	70.1%	53.7%	72.4%
Pakistani	48.4%	40.4%	53.6%
Bangladeshi	52.7%	50.4%	55.8%
Any other Asian background	63.8%	50.1%	67.8%
Black	44.7%	35.2%	49.2%
Black Caribbean	41.7%	33.5%	44.6%
Black African	48.3%	37.0%	55.3%
Any other black background	41.7%	31.1%	46.1%
Chinese	81.0%	74.1%	81.7%
Other ethnic group	54.0%	43.6%	59.4%
All pupils	54.9%	29.9%	58.9%

Note: Data is for maintained schools only

Source: data supplied by DfES

Table 6.10 reveals that, if we look at only those pupils in receipt of free school meals, white British pupils are in fact the third worst performing of the groups for which data is available. The comparatively better performance of pupils from black Caribbean and black African backgrounds when free school meals are used as a controlling proxy suggests that the poor performance of these groups overall is largely explained by their less affluent social backgrounds in comparison with other groups.

7. Conclusions

This report has presented data on a range of indicators that we suggest provide a picture of the economic profile of Britain's biggest immigrant groups. The aim of this analysis is to understand how immigration impacts the UK economy – a subject of considerable public debate. This section summarises some of the key trends revealed in the report and seeks to explain some of the differences in socio-economic outcomes that exist between groups.

It is clear from the tables presented in Section 5 that there is considerable variation between the economic characteristics of immigrant groups. This confirms the findings of previous research (Srisikandarajah *et al* 2005). The heterogeneity of immigrant groups makes any discussion of the average or overall impact of immigration highly problematic. What we can say, however, is that based on the relatively simple ranking system employed in the tables presented above, it is clear that **on most criteria, most immigrant groups do better in economic terms than the UK-born population**. Overall, when we take into account the relative size of the groups studied in this report, it would seem that the **average immigrant has better economic characteristics than the average UK-born person**.

However, this observation should not lead to complacency for those interested in promoting the socio-economic integration of immigrant communities. **There are some immigrant communities who rank consistently lower on most indicators than the UK average**. In some cases, these relatively low-ranking communities are predominantly made up of people who have come to the UK for non-economic reasons (for example, to join family members who are already in the UK, or to seek asylum). In other words, these communities may be made up of large numbers of people whose admission into the UK is not based on their potential economic contribution to the UK.

It is essential to look beyond the statistics to look at the reasons for groups' differential contributions. The relatively low rankings of Somalis, for example, may be down to the fact that many newcomers came to the UK as asylum seekers (and probably did not have the right to work while their claim was/is being processed), may not speak English, have few easily transferable skills, and have been housed in deprived areas. Similarly, at the other end of the rankings, Americans may be doing very well because they are mostly elite business people and professionals who are often here to work for short periods. **It is therefore important to consider the reasons why migrants are here before we decide whether to judge their contribution solely in economic terms. It may also be the case that groups with relatively poor economic characteristics are directly supporting those with better characteristics – for example, low-paid cleaners and security guards from countries such as Poland working in the offices of American bankers**. It is important to recognise the broader economic contribution of these low-paid essential staff. Also, **groups who are concentrated in relatively low-skilled, low-paid jobs can be ranked highly on other measures**, such as incidence of public service employment.

One potential area of concern is that **almost all of the immigrant groups in this report out-rank the UK-born in terms of length of time in education, but not all groups seem able to translate this into positive labour market outcomes**. Some groups, such as the Polish-born, may be working several levels down from their own skills level (Anderson *et al* 2006) due to the temporary nature of their migration. More concerning is the fact that other, more settled groups appear unable to access jobs at a level commensurate with their levels of education, which is possibly an indicator of **discrimination in the labour market**.

It is also interesting to note the relationship between how recently migrants arrived in the UK and their socio-economic profile. **Some relatively newly arrived groups are doing particularly badly in economic terms, whereas more settled groups are doing much better**. This may indicate that economic success increases as length of stay increases, though there are also many newcomers who seem to be doing very well.

While our evidence suggests that **some groups have fairly low average incomes and low employment rates on average, even within these groups there are very hardworking and entrepreneurial immigrants doing well for themselves**. This go-getting spirit may be

the 'x-factor' that means that some communities will do well in the future even if they are not contributing very much now.

While the analysis presented in this report compares average outcomes by country of birth, as noted at the outset, **just because some communities achieve relatively high or low rankings does not mean that every member of that community is relatively over-achieving or under-achieving**. Similarly, even if an immigrant or immigrant community has relatively good or relatively bad economic characteristics, we should be very wary of labelling some individuals or groups as successful or unsuccessful. There may be very important factors at work and unless we understand the impact of these factors, we should refrain from making strong judgments on the economic contribution of an individual or group.

It is also important to note that **outcomes can change dramatically over time**, as Section 6 reveals. One of the most notable changes has been the increase in the employment rate of some groups, particularly the Polish-born, over the period 1995/96 to 2005/06. The increase in the size of the Polish-born population since Poland joined the EU has been driven by labour migration, and the employment rate among the Polish-born has risen from considerably below the UK-born rate to considerably above it. Other fast-growing groups such as the Nigerian-born have also experienced rising employment and falling unemployment rates. In terms of income, groups such as the Ugandan and Jamaican-born moved considerably up the rankings between 1995/96 and 2005/06. Other groups, such as the Polish-born, slipped down as recent migrants from Poland have been focused in the lower end of the skills spectrum.

Another important finding that highlights how outcomes vary over time is the educational performance of children of certain backgrounds such as Chinese, Filipino, Sri Lankan and Iranian, who outperform the national average. This is indicative of the fact that **how well immigrants themselves are doing in the economy is not necessarily the best guide to the success of their children**, as the example of the Sikh community in Britain has shown (Singh 2007). Children of Indian background also perform particularly well in school and will help to consolidate the already good performance of their Indian-born parents and grandparents in the labour market. These groups are becoming part of a growing ethnic-minority middle class, perhaps analogous to the growing black middle class in the US (Landry 1987, Harris Jr 1999).

Several groups seem to be struggling to improve economic outcomes across generations. Children of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Turkish and Somali ethnicity achieve below-average results in British schools. This is perhaps because these groups tend to be concentrated in relatively deprived areas which have under-performing schools, making it difficult for them to break out of cycles of under-performance (Bhattacharyya *et al* 2003). Poor educational performance may also be related to the fact that parents from these groups tend to be more concentrated in lower social classes than immigrants from other countries, since research indicates that social class is a key determinant of educational development and performance (Gillborn and Mirza 2000, McCallum and Demie 2001, Hansen and Joshi 2007).

Previous research has highlighted the contributions that immigrants make both fiscally (Sriskandarajah *et al* 2005) and in wider economic terms (Glover *et al* 2001). **The analysis presented here confirms that many immigrant groups are making positive economic contributions**, either through paying high levels of tax and national insurance contributions, staffing our public services, or working long hours in potentially undesirable jobs. Many of these groups also appear to put little pressure on the welfare state in terms of claiming benefits, which has been a key concern in public debates around migration.

At the same time, some immigrant communities are clearly faring less well in the UK and are unable to contribute as much as others because of the poor socio-economic situations they find themselves in. Many people in these groups are present in the UK because they are fleeing persecution and violence in their home countries and require our protection. **While everything possible should be done to facilitate the successful socio-economic integration of such groups, we have to bear in mind that people who are here because we have a legal obligation to offer them protection cannot be expected to contribute to**

the same extent or as quickly as people who come for explicitly economic reasons.

That many people from refugee backgrounds have gone on to contribute such a great amount to their host country should be viewed as a bonus rather than an expectation.

Finally, we should also remember that **migrants do not only contribute to the UK's economy, but also contribute in wider social and cultural terms.** These benefits are much harder to quantify than economic benefits, but are highly visible in our everyday lives in many other ways, such as through more diverse cuisine, richer arts and culture, and increased sporting success.

References

- Anderson B, Ruhs M, Rogaly B and Spencer S (2006) *Fair Enough? Central and East European migrants in low-wage employment in the UK* York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation <http://www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/eBooks/1617-migrants-low-wage-employment.pdf>
- BBC News (2007) 'EU free movement of labour map' BBC News Online 4 January <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3513889.stm>
- Bhattacharyya G, Ison L and Blair M (2003) *Minority Ethnic Attainment and Participation in Education and Training: The evidence* Research Topic Paper RTP01-03 London: Department for Education and Skills <http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/uploadfiles/RTP01-03.pdf>
- Bloch A (2004a) 'Labour market participation and conditions of employment: A comparison of minority ethnic groups and refugees in Britain' *Sociological Research Online* 9(2) <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/9/2/bloch.html>
- Bloch A (2004b) *Making it Work: Refugee employment in the UK* Asylum and Migration Working Paper 2 London: Institute for Public Policy Research <http://www.ippr.org/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fmaking%5Fit%5Fwork%2Epdf>
- Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (2005) *Labour Market Outlook* autumn <http://www.cipd.co.uk/NR/rdonlyres/149C9564-1AB6-4AED-8F17-A6E71DE60254/0/labmktout1105.pdf>
- Clark K and Drinkwater S (2006) *Changing Patterns of Ethnic Minority Self-Employment in Britain: Evidence from census microdata* IZA Discussion Paper 2495 Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor <http://ftp.iza.org/dp2495.pdf>
- Cooley L, Farrant M and Sriskandarajah D (2005) *Selecting Wisely: Making managed migration work for Britain* London: Institute for Public Policy Research <http://www.ippr.org/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fselecting%5Fwisely%2Epdf>
- Demie F (2001) 'Ethnic and gender differences in educational achievement and implications for school improvement strategies' *Educational Research* 43(1): 91-106
- Department for Education and Skills (2006) 'National Curriculum assessment, GCSE and equivalent attainment and post-16 attainment by pupil characteristics in England 2005' first release 1 March http://www.dfes.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000640/SFR09_2006.pdf
- Department for Work and Pensions (2006) *A New Deal for Welfare: Empowering people to work* London: The Stationery Office http://www.dwp.gov.uk/welfarereform/docs/A_new_deal_for_welfare-Empowering_people_to_work-Full_Document.pdf
- Dobson J, Koser K, Mclaughlan G and Salt J (2001) *International Migration and the United Kingdom: Recent patterns and trends* RDS Occasional Paper 75 London: Home Office <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ75.pdf>
- Dorling D (2007a) 'How many of us are there and where are we? A simple independent validation of the 2001 Census and its revisions' *Environment and Planning A* 39(5): 1024-44
- Dorling D (2007b) *A Think Piece for the Commission on Integration and Cohesion* Wetherby: Communities and Local Government

http://www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/upload/assets/www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/a_think_piece_for_cioc_.pdf

Dustmann C, Frattini T and Preston I (2007) *A Study of Migrant Workers and the National Minimum Wage and Enforcement Issues that Arise* London: Low Pay Commission
<http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/research/pdf/t0Z96GJX.pdf>

Eaglesham J (2007) 'Migrants 'better skilled than Britons'' *Financial Times* 30 January: 2
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0de4f24a-b007-11db-94ab-0000779e2340.html>

Farrant M, Grieve C and Sriskandarajah D (2006) *Irregular Migration in the UK: An ippr FactFile* London: Institute for Public Policy Research
<http://www.ippr.org/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Firregular%5Fmigration%2Epdf>

Gillborn D and Mirza HS (2000) *Educational Inequality: Mapping race, class and gender – A synthesis of research evidence* London: Ofsted <http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/assets/447.pdf>

Glover S, Gott C, Loizillon A, Portes J, Price R, Spencer S, Srinivasan V and Willis C (2001) *Migration: An economic and social analysis* RDS Occasional Paper 67 London: Home Office <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ67-migration.pdf>

Gold SJ, Light I and Johnston MF (2006) 'The second generation and self-employment' *Migration Information Source* October
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=447>

Gott C and Johnston K (2002) *The Migrant Population in the UK: Fiscal effects* RDS Occasional Paper 77 London: Home Office
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ77migrant.pdf>

Hansen K and Joshi H (2007) *Millennium Cohort Study – Second survey: A user's guide to initial findings* London: Institute of Education
http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/core/documents/download.asp?id=855andlog_stat=1

Haque R (2002) *Migrants in the UK: A descriptive analysis of their characteristics and labour market performance, based on the Labour Force Survey* London: Department for Work and Pensions <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2003/migration-report/full-report.PDF>

Harris H (2004) *The Somali Community in the UK: What we know and how we know it* London: Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK, King's College London <http://www.icar.org.uk/download.php?id=67>

Harris Jr RL (1999) 'The rise of the black middle class' *The World and I* 14(2): 40
<http://www.worldandi.com/public/1999/February/middle.cfm>

Hiebert D (2002) 'Economic associations of immigrant self-employment in Canada' *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research* 8(1/2): 93-112

Hodge M (2007) 'A message to my fellow immigrants' *The Observer* 20 May: 34
<http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2083763,00.html>

Home Office (2006) *Asylum Statistics: United Kingdom 2005* Home Office Statistical Bulletin 14/06 London: Home Office <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/hosb1406.pdf>

Home Office (2007) *Asylum Statistics: 4th quarter 2006, United Kingdom* London: Home Office <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/asylumq406.pdf>

- Home Office, Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and Customs and Communities and Local Government (2007) *Accession Monitoring Report: May 2004-March 2007* London: Home Office
<http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/6353/aboutus/AccessionMonitoringReport11.pdf>
- Kelly R, Morrell G and Sriskandarajah D (2005) *Migration and Health in the UK: An ippr FactFile* London: Institute for Public Policy Research
http://www.ippr.org/research/files/team19/project158/FFHealthFinal%20_2_.pdf
- Kyambi S (2005) *Beyond Black and White: Mapping new immigrant communities* London: Institute for Public Policy Research
- Landry B (1987) *The New Black Middle Class* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
- Manacorda M, Manning A and Wadsworth J (2006) *The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Male Wages: Theory and evidence from Britain* Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper 2352 Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor
<http://ftp.iza.org/dp2352.pdf>
- McCallum I and Demie F (2001) 'Social class, ethnicity and educational performance' *Educational Research* 43(2): 147-59
- OECD (2007a) *International Migration Outlook: Annual report, 2007 edition* Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- OECD (2007b) *OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, environmental and social statistics* Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- Office for National Statistics (2003) *Labour Force Survey User Guide – Volume 1: Background and methodology* London: Office for National Statistics
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_labour/LFSUG_Vol1_2003.pdf
- Office for National Statistics (2006) 'Over 500 a day gained through migration to the UK' news release 2 November <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/intmigrat1106.pdf>
- Pearce N (2007) 'Fair Rules: Rethinking fairness' *Public Policy Research* 14(1): 11-22
- Peri G (2007) *Immigrants' Complementarities and Native Wages: Evidence from California* NBER Working Paper 12956 New York: National Bureau of Economic Research
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w12956>
- Pinkerton C, McLaughlan G and Salt J (2004) *Sizing the Illegally Resident Population in the UK* Home Office Online Report 58/04 London: Home Office
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/rdsolr5804.pdf>
- Rendall M and Salt J (2005) 'The foreign-born population', in Chappell R (ed.) *Focus On People and Migration* London: Palgrave Macmillan: 131-52
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/fom2005/08_FOPM_ForeignBorn.pdf
- Salt J and Millar J (2006) 'Foreign labour in the United Kingdom: Current patterns and trends' *Labour Market Trends* 114(10): 335-55
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/labour_market_trends/foreign_labour.pdf
- Scanlon K and Whitehead C (2004) *International Trends in Housing Tenure and Mortgage Finance* London: Council of Mortgage Lenders
http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/filegrab/pdf_pub_resreps_51full.pdf.pdf?ref=3870

- Scottish Executive (2005) 'Social focus on deprived areas' news release 27 September
<http://www.scottishexecutive.gov.uk/News/Releases/2005/09/27111219>
- Singh G (2007) 'A turning point?' *Catalyst* March-April: 22-24
<http://www.catalystmagazine.org/Default.aspx.LocID-0hgnew0s6.RefLocID-0hg01b00100o.Lang-EN.htm>
- Spence L (2005) *Country of Birth and Labour Market Outcomes in London: An analysis of Labour Force Survey and Census data* DMAG Briefing 2005/1 London: Greater London Authority <http://www.london.gov.uk/gla/publications/factsandfigures/DMAG-Briefing-2005-1.pdf>
- Spencer S, Ruhs M, Anderson B and Rogaly B (2007) *Migrants' Lives Beyond the Workplace: The experiences of Central and East Europeans in the UK* York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation <http://www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/eBooks/2045-migrants-experiences-UK.pdf>
- Sriskandarajah D, Cooley L and Reed H (2005) *Paying Their Way: The fiscal contribution of immigrants in the UK* London: Institute for Public Policy Research
<http://www.ippr.org/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2FPaying+Their+Way%2Epdf>
- Sriskandarajah D and Drew C (2006) *Brits Abroad: Mapping the scale and nature of British emigration* London: Institute for Public Policy Research
- Whitehead T (2007) 'Revealed: The true scale of Europe's exodus to Britain' *Daily Express* 28 February: 5
- Winder R (2004) *Bloody Foreigners: The story of immigration to Britain* London: Little, Brown
- Woodbridge J (2005) *Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001* Home Office Online Report 29/05 London: Home Office
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf>